We develop a model of bidding markets with financial constraintsà la Che and Gale (1998b) in which two firms choose their budgets optimally and we extend it to a dynamic setting over an infinite horizon. We provide three main results for the case in which the exogenous cash-flow is not too large and the opportunity cost of budgets is positive but arbitrarily low. First, firms keep small budgets and markups are high most of the time. Second, the dispersion of markups and "money left on the table" across procurement auctions hinges on di↵erences, both endogenous and exogenous, in the availability of financial resources rather than on significant private information. Third, we explain why the empirical analysis of the size of markups based on the standard auction model may have a bias, downwards or upwards, positively correlated with the availability of financial resources. A numerical example illustrates that our model is able to generate a rich set of values for markups, bid dispersion and concentration.
derive a large part of their revenues from doing contract work for the state." Besides, Porter and Zona (1993) explain that "The set of firms submitting bids on large projects was small and fairly stable [...] There may have been significant barriers to entry, and there was little entry in a growing market." 8
Motivated by these observations, we build a static model in which two firms endowed with some cash choose working capitals to compete in a first price auction for a procurement contract. The cost of complying is known and identical across firms, the minimum acceptable bid increases with the firm's working capital and only cash is publicly observable. 9 Since using cash as working capital means postponing consumption, it is costly. 10
Firms choose their working capitals and bids optimally. The static model provides a simple setting with a unique equilibrium that illustrates the strategic forces that shape our results. The dynamic model consists of the infinite repetition of the static model. The cash at the beginning of each period is equal to the last period unspent working capital plus the earnings in previous procurement contract and some exogenous cash-flow.
In our static model, to carry more working capital than strictly necessary to make the bid acceptable is strictly dominated because of its cost. Thus, the firm that carries more working capital wins the contract 11 and both firms incur the cost of their working capital.
The strategic considerations that shape the equilibrium working capitals are the same as in the all pay auction with complete information. 12 Not surprisingly, in a version of our game with unlimited cash, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which firms randomize in a bounded interval with an atomless distribution. This is also the unique equilibrium in our game when the firms' cash is larger than the upper bound of the support of the equilibrium randomization. We call the scenario symmetric if this is the case, and laggard-leader otherwise. In this latter case, firms also randomize in a bounded interval, 8 Moreover, it can be shown that in a model with many firms and entry the natural extension of the equilibrium we study has the feature that only two firms with the most cash enter the market.
9 Our first main result and the part of our second main result regarding markups also hold in a version of our model with observable working capital, see Beker and Hernando-Veciana (2011) . 10 Any other motivation for the cost of working capital would deliver similar results. 11 This feature seems realistic in many procurement contracts: "It is thought that Siemens' superior financial firepower was a significant factor in it beating Canada's Bombardier to preferred bidder status on Thameslink," in Minister blocks. . . , The Guardian, 11/Dec/2011. 12 It resembles Che and Gale's (1998a) model of an all pay auction with caps in that working capitals are bounded by cash. Our model is more general in that they assume exogenous caps common to all agents.
though the firm with less cash, the laggard hereafter, puts an atom at zero and the other firm, the leader, at the laggard's cash.
In our dynamic model, we characterize a class of equilibria that contains the limit of the sequence of the unique equilibrium of models with an increasing number of periods.
Remarkably, the marginal continuation value of cash is equal to its marginal consumption value under a mild assumption about the minimum acceptable bid. Thus, as in the static model, firms do not carry more working capital than strictly necessary to make the bid acceptable and the strategic interaction each period is, again, similar to an all pay auction.
On the equilibrium path, the frequency of each scenario is determined both by the exogenous cash-flow and by the minimum acceptable bid as a function of the working capital. If one keeps the latter fixed, the following cases arise. If the exogenous cash-flow is su ciently small, the laggard-leader scenario occurs most of the time as the cost of working capital becomes negligible. This insight implies our first main result (Theorem 1). Another consequence is that one of the firms tends to win consecutive procurement contracts. 13 If the exogenous cash-flow is su ciently large, the symmetric scenario occurs each period. In this case, the probability that a given firm wins the contract is constant across periods.
To understand the second main result (Corollaries 3 and 5), note that the dispersion of markups and "money left on the table" is due to heterogeneity across auctions in the availability of financial resources. Financial resources in the form of cash and minimum acceptable bids a↵ect the equilibrium working capitals which determine the bids, and hence the markups and "money left on the table". To understand the third main result (Corollaries 4 and 6), note that biases in the structural estimation of markups can also arise if, as it is often the case, the researcher does not observe costs. Imagine bid data from several auctions with identical financial conditions and suppose the data are generated by our static model. On the one hand, if the laggard has little cash, there are large markups and little "money left on the table". However, a researcher who assumed the standard model would conclude that there is little cost heterogeneity and, consequently, small markups, i.e. the estimation would be biased downwards. On the other hand, if 13 To the extent that joint profits are larger in the laggard-leader scenario than in the symmetric scenario, our result is related to the literature on increasing dominance due to e ciency e↵ects (see Budd, Harris, and Vickers (1993) , Cabral and Riordan (1994) and Athey and Schmutzler (2001) the laggard has relatively large cash, but not too large, there is sizable "money left on the table" and relatively low markups. However, a researcher who assumed the standard model would conclude that there is large cost heterogeneity and, as a consequence, large markups, i.e. the estimation would be biased upwards. Che and Gale (1998b) and Zheng (2001) show that the dispersion of markups can reflect heterogeneity of working capital if it is su ciently scarce. 14 We show that scarcity is the typical situation if firms choose their working capital. Whereas they assume that the distribution of working capitals is constant across firms, our results show that this distribution is seldom constant across firms. This di↵erence is important because the lack of asymmetries in the distribution of working capitals precludes the possibility of large expected money left on the table when private information is small.
Firms also choose working capitals in Galenianos and Kircher's (2008) model of monetary policy and in Burkett's (2014) principal-agent model of bidding. Whereas the all pay auction structure only arises in the former, the laggard-leader scenario does not occur because working capital is not bounded by cash.
Our paper contributes to a recent literature that explains how asymmetries in market shares arise and persist in otherwise symmetric models. In particular, Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) , and Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2010) show that firm-specific shocks can give rise to a dynamic of market shares similar to ours. The di↵erence, though, is that the dynamic in our model arises because firms randomize their working capital due to the all pay auction structure.
Our characterization of the dynamics resembles that of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) in that we study a Markov process in which two persistent scenarios occur infinitely often and we analyse their frequencies as the randomness vanishes. While the transition function of their process is exogenous, ours stems from the equilibrium strategies.
Section 2 explains how we model financial constraints. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the static and the dynamic model, respectively. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix and the supplementary material.
14 See also Che and Gale (1996, 2000) , and DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) . Pitchik and Schotter (1988) , Maskin (2000) , Benoit and Krishna (2001) and Pitchik (2009) study how bidders distribute a fixed budget in a sequence of auctions. This is not an issue in our setup.
A Reduced Form Model of Procurement with Financial

Constraints
In this section, we describe a model of procurement that we later embed in the models of Sections 3 and 4. Two firms 15 compete for a procurement contract of common and known cost c in a first price auction: each firm submits a bid, and the firm who submits the lowest bid gets the contract at a price equal to its bid. 16 Only bids in a restricted set, the acceptable bids, are allowed. In particular, we assume that the minimum acceptable bid of a firm with working capital w 0 is given by 17
where ⇡ is strictly decreasing, satisfies ⇡(0) > 0 and lim w!1 ⇡(w) < 0 and is continuously di↵erentiable.
As we discuss in the Introduction, our assumption that firms can submit only acceptable bids captures a wide range of institutional arrangements whose aim is to preclude firms from submitting unsustainable bids such as bids that cannot be financed. 18 Alternatively, the sponsor may provide incentives to guarantee that firms submit only acceptable bids by making them bear some of the cost of default. The monotonicity of the set of acceptable bids arises naturally in markets in which firms have limited access to external financial resources, as we discuss in the Introduction and Section S4 of the supplementary material.
For any given bids b 1 and b 2 , we use markup to denote
and we use "money left on the table" to denote
15 As in all pay auctions, see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) , if there are more than two firms then there are multiple equilibria. One such equilibrium is that in which two firms choose the equilibrium strategies of the two-firm model and the other firms choose zero working capital. 16 A sale auction of a good with common and known value v can be easily encompassed in our analysis assuming that c = v < 0 and bids are negative numbers.
17 Thus, the model of auctions with budget constraints analysed by Che and Gale (1998b) in Section 3.2 corresponds in our framework with b ⇤ (w) = w and ⇡(w) = v w, and the interpretation in Footnote 16. 18 For instance, Meaney (2012) says that "As well as considering the financial aspects of bids, the DfT [the sponsor] assesses the deliverability and quality of the bidders' proposals so as to be confident that the successful bidder is able to deliver on the commitments made in the bidding process." Definition 1. ✓ is the working capital for which the minimum acceptable bid is equal to the cost of the procurement contract c so that ⇡(✓) = 0 or, equivalently, ✓ = ⇡ 1 (0).
Our assumptions on ⇡ imply that there exists a unique ✓ 2 (0, 1).
The Static Model
Each firm i 2 {1, 2} starts with some cash m i 0. We assume the firm's cash to be publicly observable. Each firm i chooses simultaneously and independently (I) how much of its cash to keep as working capital w i 2 [0, m i ] and (II) an acceptable bid b i b ⇤ (w i ) for a market as described in Section 2. A pure strategy is thus denoted by the vector
profit in the market against another firm with cash m j that bids b j is equal to:
where we are applying the usual uniformly random tie breaking rule except in the case in which one firm has strictly more cash than the other. In this case, we assume that the firm with strictly more cash wins. 20 We assume that the firm maximises
that is, m i w i , its consumption hereafter, plus the discounted sum, at rate 2 (0, 1), of the working capital and the expected profit in the market. Note that a unit increase in working capital is costly in the sense that it reduces the current utility in one unit and increases the future utility in . Thus, the cost of working capital becomes negligible when increases to 1.
We start by simplifying the strategy space. First, any strategy (b, w) in which b > b ⇤ (w) is strictly dominated by the strategy (b,w) wherew satisfies b = b ⇤ (w) so that it is never optimal to carry more working capital than is strictly necessary. 21 Thus, we restrict to the set of pure strategies {(b, w) : b = b ⇤ (w), w 2 [0, m]} where m denotes the firm's cash.
In our second simplification of the strategy space, we use the following definition:
Since w = ✓ solves (4) for = 1, the Implicit Function Theorem implies:
Thus, ⌫ denotes the working capital for which ⇡(⌫ ), the discounted procurement profits associated with the minimum acceptable bid corresponding to working capital ⌫ , equals (1 )⌫ , the implicit costs of selecting working capital ⌫ that are associated with postponing consumption. Any pure strategy (b ⇤ (w), w) in which w > ⌫ is strictly dominated by (b ⇤ (⌫ ), ⌫ ). As a consequence, we further restrict the set of pure strategies
where m denotes the firm's cash.
Once we eliminate the above strictly dominated strategies, the resulting reduced game has a unidimensional strategy space as an all pay auction. Each firm chooses a working capital and its corresponding minimum acceptable bid. The firm with the higher working capital wins the procurement contract and carrying working capital is costly for each firm.
As in all pay auctions, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. This can be easily understood when each of the two firms' cash is weakly larger than ⌫ . If both firms choose di↵erent working capitals, the one with more working capital has a strictly profitable deviation: to decrease marginally its working capital. 23 If both firms choose the same working capital w, there is also a strictly profitable deviation: to increase marginally its working capital if w < ⌫ , and to choose zero working capital if w = ⌫ . 24
21 The probability that a firm wins the contract is una↵ected but the cost of working capital increases. 22 Note that this equation is equivalent to m w + w + ⇡(w) = m. 23 It saves on the cost of working capital without a↵ecting to the cases in which the firm wins and increases the profits from the procurement contract because it increases the price. 24 In the former case, the deviation is profitable because winning the procurement contract at w < ⌫ gives strictly positive profits and the deviation breaks the tie in favor of the deviating firm with an arbitrarily small increase in the cost of working capital and an arbitrarily small decrease in the profits from the procurement contract. In the latter case, w = ⌫ implies that one of the firms is winning with a probability strictly less than one, and hence the definition of ⌫ , see Footnote 22, means that this firm makes strictly lower expected payo↵s than with zero working capital.
A mixed strategy over the set of strictly undominated strategies is described by a distribution function with support 25 contained in the set {(b, w) : [w, w] , then the expected payo↵ to the other firm with cash m w from choosing w 2 (w, w) is
so that indi↵erence across the support results only if F satisfies the di↵erential equation
for any w 2 (w, w). Thus, (1 ), the increase in the cost of working capital w(1 ), must equal F 0 (w)⇡(w) + F (w) ⇡ 0 (w), the change in the expected discounted profits ⇡(w)F (w). There is both a positive e↵ect and a negative e↵ect of an increase in w on the change in expected discounted profits. The former arises due to the higher probability of winning a contract and the latter due to the lower profits associated with a win.
We distinguish two scenarios: , F where b ⇤ is defined in (1) and
with support [0, ⌫ ] solves the di↵erential equation (7) with initial condition F (0) = 0.
Besides: (i) the equilibrium probability of winning the contract is common across firms;
(ii) the equilibrium is una↵ected by any change in cash that leaves m This equilibrium satisfies the usual property of all pay auctions that bidders without competitive advantage get their outside opportunity, i.e. the payo↵ of carrying zero working capital and losing the procurement contract.
Besides, one can deduce the following corollary from (8) using (5).
Corollary 1. If m l ✓, then in equilibrium, |⇡(w 1 ) ⇡(w 2 )| and ⇡(max {w 1 , w 2 }) converge in distribution to 0 as increases to 1. In the standard auction model, cost heterogeneity vanishes as the distribution of costs converges to the degenerate distribution that puts all the weight on one value. As cost heterogeneity vanishes, the markup and "money left on the table" vanish (Krishna (2002) , Chapter 2). Corollary 1 says that this limit outcome also arises as increases to 1 in the symmetric scenario, see Definition 3, since the markup
is equal to
and "money left on the table"
. In this sense, financial constraints become irrelevant as increases to 1.
We next consider the laggard-leader scenario, see Definition 3. In what follows, the leader refers to the firm that starts with more cash and the laggard to the other firm.
Proposition 2. If m l < ⌫ and m 1 6 = m 2 , then in the unique equilibrium, 26 the laggard's strategy is
where b ⇤ is defined in (1) and each of the distributions
has support [0, m l ] and solves the di↵erential equation (7) with separate boundary conditions so that F l (m l ) = 1 and F l has an atom at 0 while F L (0) = 0 and F L has an atom at 1.
One can deduce the following corollary from Proposition 2 using (5).
Corollary 2. If m l < ⌫ and m 1 6 = m 2 , then (i) the leader is more likely to win the contract and (ii) for any m l < ✓, as increases to 1, F L (w) converges to m l (w) and the equilibrium probability that the winner is the leader converges to 1
Since each firm is indi↵erent among all points in its support, the laggard receives a payo↵ equal to the symmetric payo↵ (when it chooses its atom 0) and the leader receives a premium over the symmetric payo↵ (when it chooses its atom m l ). This di↵erence occurs because, unlike the symmetric case, the leader is not only able but also willing to undercut any acceptable bid of the laggard.
Corollary 3. If m l < ⌫ and m 1 6 = m 2 , (i) an increase in m l for which m l < ⌫ increases (in the sense of first order stochastic dominance) both equilibrium distributions of working capitals and hence, decreases the equilibrium expectation of ⇡(max{w 1 , w 2 }), and (ii) the equilibrium probability that each firm chooses its atom simultaneously is:
Corollary 3 is direct from (9) and (10) and it is the starting point for our second main result. Point (i) shows that the dispersion of markups,
observed across auctions can be explained by variations in the laggard's cash and it suggests that the same can apply to the dispersion of "money left on the table",
Note that a similar argument also applies with respect to changes in ⇡. Point (ii) also casts doubts about the usual interpretation of "money left on the table" as indicative of incomplete information. To see why, consider the linear example 27 ⇡(w) = ✓ w. In this case, as ✓ increases to infinity, the probability that each firm chooses its atom simultaneously tends to 1 so that the "money left on the table" tends to
Thus, a su ciently large ✓ implies almost no uncertainty together with sizable "money left on the table." Note that the implications about "money left on the table" that are only suggested by Corollary 3, are proved in Corollary 5 for the dynamic model under the assumptions that the exogenous cashflow (defined in Section 4.1) is not too large, in a sense we formalise later, and is su ciently close to 1.
27 If ⇡(w) = ✓ w, the equilibrium probability that each firm chooses its atom simultaneously is:
Here, the laggard's cash is exogenous but in the model of Section 4 we show in a numerical example that the endogenous distribution of the laggard's cash has su cient variability to generate significant dispersion of markups and "money left on the table" across otherwise identical auctions. Interestingly, these results are provided for parameter values for which there is little uncertainty.
Corollary 4. If m l < ✓ and m 1 6 = m 2 , then as increases to 1: (i) in equilibrium,
⌘⌘ .
The corollary follows by inspection of (5), 9) and (10). Intuitively, (i) can be explained because the leader increases its probability of winning by shifting all its probability mass to m l as increases to 1. Since working capital is costless in the limit, the laggard's randomization guarantees the indi↵erence of the leader by balancing the positive and negative e↵ects of an increase in working capital on the expected discounted profits, which explains (ii).
Corollary 4 implies that when is close to 1 and m l <m, wherem ⌘ ⇡ 1 (
e ) and e denotes the Euler constant 2.718 . . ., the markup,
, decreases 29 and the expected "money left on the table",
, increases as the laggard's cash m l increases. This is the basis for our third main result. Suppose that is close to 1 and that the bid data from several auctions with identical financial constraints are generated by the model with constant procurement cost c. If m l < ⌫ , then Corollary 4 states that the average "money left on the table" will be small and there will be large markups when m l is close to zero but the average "money left on the table" will be substantial and markups small when m l =m. In what follows we assume that m l < ⌫ . The bid data reveals the "money left on the table" but costs and, therefore, markups are not observable. If the average "money left on the table" were small, as would happen if m l is 28 Proving (ii) requires some non-trivial computations. F l converges to a distribution with an atom of probability ⇡(m l )
. This together with the convergence of F L (w) to m l (w) implies that the expectation of |b1 b2| = ⇡(min{w1, w2}) ⇡(max{w1, w2}) converges to:
«« .
close to zero, an interpretation of the bid data using the standard model would conclude that there was little cost heterogeneity and small markups even though there were large markups in the generated data. That is, the results would be biased downward. If the average "money left on the table" were substantial, as would happen if m l =m, then an interpretation of the bid data using the standard model would conclude that there was large cost heterogeneity and therefore large markups even though there were small markups in the generated data. That is, the results on markups would be biased upwards.
Finally, in Proposition 3 we describe the equilibrium strategies when each firm has cash m < ⌫ . We use ⇠ 2 (0, ✓) to denote the function implicitly defined as the unique solution in m to:
By (1), (2) and (3), the left hand side of (12) is equal to the di↵erence in a firm's expected payo↵s between choosing working capital m and zero working capital when the other firm
where F is defined in (8). By (1), (2) and (3), the left hand side of (13) is equal to the di↵erence in a firm's expected payo↵s between choosing working capital m and zero working capital when the other firm chooses a working capital in (0, (m)) with probability F ( (m)) and a working capital equal to m with probability 1 F ( (m)).
Proposition 3. If m 1 = m 2 = m then the unique equilibrium is symmetric and denoted
and F is defined in (8).
30 Existence and uniqueness of the solution follow from the properties of the left hand side of the equation. This is increasing in (m), it is negative at (m) = 0 and it is strictly positive at (m) = m. The first one is direct, the second can be deduced from (12) using that m > ⇠ , and the third from the definition of ⌫ , in (4), using that m < ⌫ , and the definition of F in (8).
The equilibrium in the first case is explained by the fact that m  ⇠ implies that the left hand side of (12) is weakly positive and hence the best response to m is m . This is not the case when m > ⇠ as the left hand side of (12) is strictly negative. Instead, the equilibrium in this case is constructed by shifting probability away from the common amount of cash and placing it at the bottom of the space of working capitals according to a distribution that solves the di↵erential equation (7).
We shall not discuss the implications of Proposition 3 as in our dynamic model the case in which both firms cash is less than ✓ does not arise along the game tree. See our discussion after introducing Assumption 1.
The Dynamic Model
In this section, we endogenise the distribution of cash by assuming that it is derived from the past market outcomes. This approach provides a natural framework to analyse the conventional wisdom in economics that "auctions [still] work well if raising cash for bids is easy." In Theorem 1, we provide conditions under which the laggard-leader scenario occurs most of the time. This is the basis for our first main result. Besides, we provide formal results in Corollaries 5 and 6 and a numerical example that, on the one hand, complement the previous section analysis of the second and third main results and, on the other hand, shed some light on the concentration and asymmetries of market shares.
The Game
We consider the infinite horizon dynamic version of the game in the last section. We assume that both firms have the same amount of cash in the first period. Afterwards each firm's cash is equal to its working capital in the previous period plus the profits in the procurement contract and some exogenous cash flow 31 m > 0. We assume that m is constant across time and firms, and interpret it as derived from other activities of the firm. Hence, in any period t in which firms start with cash (m 1,t , m 2,t ), choose working capitals (w 1,t , w 2,t ) and bids (b 1,t , b 2,t ), and Firm 1 wins the procurement contract with profits b 1,t c, the next period distribution of cash is equal to:
Firm i 2 {1, 2} wins in period t with probability one if b i,t < b j,t or if b i,t = b j,t and m i,t > m j,t , with probability 1/2 if b i,t = b j,t and m i,t = m j,t , and loses otherwise. The payo↵ in period t of a firm with cash m t that chooses working capital w t is equal to its consumption m t w t . The firm's lifetime payo↵ in a subgame beginning at period ⌧ is:
where (m t , w t ) denotes its cash and working capital holdings in period t. We assume that the firm maximises its expected lifetime payo↵ at any period ⌧ .
The following assumption 32 is used in the proof of Proposition 4. Since ⇡(w) is the minimum profit that a firm with working capital w can make when it wins the procurement contract, (14) and Assumption 1 imply that the firm that wins the procurement contract one period, starts next period with cash at least ✓. As we explain after Proposition 4, this assumption guarantees that firms do not want to carry more working capital than strictly necessary to make the bid acceptable. Assumption 1 also implies that ✓ must be less than any common amount of cash held by the firms in any information set after the first period. We show in Proposition 3, for the case of the static model, that a tedious case di↵erentiation is necessary if one allows firms to have identical cash less than ✓. For the same reason, we assume that both firms start in the first period with cash greater than ✓. 33 We denote by ⌦ the set of cash vectors that may arise in the information sets of the game tree. A Markov mixed strategy consists of a randomization over the set of , w 0 , m 0 ) which is equal to:
where: 
The Equilibrium Strategies
In what follows, we define a value function, a bid function and a working capital distribution and show that they are a BI equilibrium. Our proposed strategies generalize the equilibrium strategies in Section 3. The bid function is, as in the static model, the minimum acceptable bid (with a slight abuse of notation):
34 In a version of our model with finitely many periods studied in the supplementary material there is a unique equilibrium that is symmetric. We also show that as the horizon increases to infinity, the limit of that equilibrium is a BI equilibrium.
We find our equilibrium distribution of working capital by setting up a fixed point problem over a set of functions and then use the solution of this problem to describe the equilibrium distribution. We set up the fixed point problem as follows. We start with a non-empty, closed, bounded and convex subset P of the space of all bounded continuous functions.
For each function in this class P we set up a di↵erential equation that depends on .
We then consider the unique continuous solution, F m , to this di↵erential equation with initial condition F (m) = 1. Lastly, we seek in P that is a fixed point of an operator T : P ! P where T ( ) is described in terms of F m . Once we have this fixed point, say, we then use F m to define the equilibrium distribution of working capital and it turns out that determines the equilibrium premium earned by a leader (see (25)).
Let P be defined as: 
The functional form of F m can be found in (A4) in the Appendix. 36 Note that (18) is analogous to (7) and that (18) is identical to (7) when is the zero function.
Definition 6. We denote by⌫ the unique value of m2 [0, ✓) for which F m (0) = 0. By (8) and Definitions 2 and 6, we see that ⌫ = F 1 (1) and⌫ = ⌫ when is the zero function.
We underscore that, for any m ⌫ , F m (w) is a distribution of w (given the pair ( , m)) with support in [0, m] that is continuous for w 2 (0, m) but it has an atom of size Consider the following functional equation:
35 The uniqueness of the solution follows from Theorem 7.1 in Coddington and Levinson (1984) , pag. 22. 36 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that (18) has an explicit solution.
where T : P ! P is defined as: 37 Lemma S2 in the supplementary material shows that the set of fixed points b P is not empty. Let:
For any (m, m 0 ) 2 ⌦, let:
and:
Thus, (m 0 ) is an additive premium associated to being leader. Thus, neither ⇤ nor W ⇤ change discontinuously at any of these points. 
since 2 P . 38 The limit of the unique equilibrium of the finite horizon model is one of the equilibria described in Proposition 4, see the supplementary material.
The intuition behind the proposition is based on our results in the static model. There, we use the property that the game has the all pay auction structure: after deleting strictly dominated strategies, the firm that carries more working capital wins but carrying working capital is costly for both firms. This argument also applies here because this property is inherited from one period to the previous one in the following sense: if the payo↵s of the reduced game in period t satisfy the property, so do the payo↵s of the reduced game in period t 1. To see why, note that the usual result of all pay auctions that bidders without competitive advantage get their outside opportunity implies here that the laggard's equilibrium payo↵s in the reduced game of period t are equal to the payo↵s of consuming all its cash and starting period t + 1 as a laggard with cash m. The leader's equilibrium payo↵s in the reduced game in period t have an additive premium which is a consequence of the leader's ability to carry su cient working capital to undercut any acceptable bid of the laggard. This ability is independent of the amount of cash the leader has and so it is the premium. Consequently, the value of a marginal increase in the cash with which the firm starts period t is equal to its consumption value plus the value of switching from laggard to leader. The value of switching from laggard to leader is zero because a marginal increase in cash switches the leadership only when the cash is common and no less than ✓ (by (14) and Assumption 1) so that the premium is zero because none of the firms is constrained by cash to bid above cost. We can thus conclude that, in period t 1, a unit increase in working capital, keeping constant the bid, is costly in the sense that it reduces the current consumption in one unit but only increases the future utility in its discounted value . This means, as in the static model, that it is not profitable to carry more working capital than necessary to make the bid acceptable. Thus, in period t 1, after deleting strictly dominated strategies, the firm that carries more working capital wins but carrying working capital is costly for both firms. 39 We can also distinguish here between the symmetric and laggard-leader scenarios and it may be shown that an analogous version of points (i)-(iii) in Proposition 1 and properly adapted versions of Corollaries 1-4 hold true as well.
39 Note that the property that firms do not want to carry more working capital than strictly necessary to make the bid acceptable is also a property of the unique equilibrium of the finite version of our model. This is because the recursive argument in the previous paragraph can be applied starting from the last period since the last period is the same game as the static model. See the supplementary material.
The Equilibrium Dynamics
To study the frequency of the symmetric and the laggard-leader scenarios, we study the stochastic process of the laggard's cash induced by our equilibrium. Its state space is equal to [m, ⌫ + m] because the procurement profits are non negative and none of the firms' working capitals is larger than ⌫ . In period t + 1, the pair of cash holdings (m 1,t+1 , m 2,t+1 ) (see (14)) and, therefore, the laggard's cash in period t + 1, denoted by m t+1 ⌘ min {m 1,t+1 , m 2,t+1 }, are determined by the distribution over working capitals (w 1,t , w 2,t ) and bids (b 1,t , b 2,t ) in period t which is completely determined by the laggard's cash m t in period t. Thus, the laggard's cash follows a Markov process. Let B denote the Borel sets of [m, ⌫ + m]. The probability that m t+1 lies in a Borel set given that m t = m is given by a transition function Q : [m, ⌫ + m] ⇥ B ! [0, 1] that can be easily deduced from the equilibrium. In particular, it is defined by: 40
This expression is equal to 1 minus the probability that both the laggard's and the leader's working capitals are strictly larger than x m. 
Standard arguments 41 can be used to show that there exists a unique invariant distribution (which we denote by µ ), and that µ is globally stable and has support 42 [m, ⌫ +m].
A suitable law of large numbers can be applied to show that the fraction of time that the Markov process spends on any set M 2 B converges (almost surely) to µ(M).
Typically, the frequency of each scenario depends on a non trivial way on the transition
probabilities. An exception is when the transition probabilities do not depend on the 40 As a convention, we denote by [m, m] the singleton {m}. 41 See Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) . 42 Here is where the assumption m > 0 makes a di↵erence as the support of the invariant distribution would be equal to {0} if m = 0. This is because zero becomes an absorbing state of the dynamics of the laggard's cash when m = 0. To see why, note that a feature of the equilibrium is that a laggard that chooses zero working capital in any given period loses with probability one in the auction of that period.
Thus, the laggard starts next period with zero cash if m = 0 and its only feasible working capital is zero.
state. 43 By (21) and (26) (26), (27), Proposition 1, Corollary 1 and the fact that ✓ > ⌫ by Definitions 6 and 7 so no proof is provided.
Proposition 5. If ✓ m < 1, then: (i) the equilibrium probability of winning the contract at any date t is common across firms, (ii) lim "1 µ ({✓ + m}) = 1 and (iii) both (a) the fraction of time that both firms choose working capital structure arbitrarily close to ✓, and (b) ⇡(max{w 1,t , w 2,t }), and |⇡(w 1,t ) ⇡(w 2,t )| are arbitrarily close to 0 converges (almost surely) to 1 as increases to 1.
The ratio ✓ m decreases in the cash flow m and increases in the working capital ✓ needed to push the bid down to c. Proposition 5 illustrates the conventional wisdom that "auctions
[still] work well if raising cash for bids is easy" as in our model, for a fixed m, it is easy to raise cash for bids from internal or external resources if is close to 1 or if ✓ is small, respectively. Next, Theorem 1 and Corollary 5(i), which are the basis for our first main result, show that the ease to raise cash from internal resources is not su cient for auctions to work well. In the more di cult case in which the transition probabilities depend on the state, the invariant distribution associated to the limit transition probabilities as increases to 1 has an easy characterization. This is because the transition probabilities become degenerate and concentrate its probability in one point only, either m or ✓ + m, and thus any distribution with support in {m, ✓ + m} is an invariant distribution.
Since there are multiple invariant distributions, we cannot apply a continuity argument to characterize what happens when the cost of working capital is small.
properties hold in equilibrium converges to 1 (almost surely) as increases to 1: (i) ⇡(max{w 1,t , w 2,t }) is arbitrarily close to ⇡(m), and (ii) |⇡(w 1,t ) ⇡(w 2,t )| is arbitrarily close to ⇡(0) ⇡(m).
Corollary 5 follows since as increases to 1: µ ({m}) increases to 1, by Theorem 1, and the laggard and the leader play with probability arbitrarily close to 1 at their atoms when the laggard's cash is m, by Lemma A5 in the Appendix, the assumption that ✓ m > 4 and
, the first line of (A13) and Lemma A8(ii) in the Appendix. Thus, if m is su ciently small given ⇡, then, as tends to 1, the leader wins the procurement contract most of the time so that large concentrations and asymmetries in market shares occur. The next section provides a quantitative example.
Corollary 5 is the basis for extending our second main result to the dynamic model:
the dispersion of markups
, and "money left on the table",
, across auctions arises only due to di↵erences in the exogenous cash flow m and the function ⇡. Thus, Corollary 5 gives a general setting that goes beyond the linear example and su ciently large ✓ discussed after Corollary 3. Each case shows that it is incorrect to infer, as is typically done, that the dispersion of markups and "money left on the table" indicates incomplete information. That is, the usual interpretation is incorrect in this setting.
Corollary 6. If ✓ m > 4 and ⇡(2m) + ⇡(m) > ⇡(0), the following properties hold in equilibrium (almost surely) as increases to 1: (i) lim
close to ⇡(m), and (ii) lim
For those m satisfying the assumptions of Corollary 6, an argument analogous to the one we made after Corollary 4 let us extend our third main result to the dynamic model. 44
A Numerical Example
In this section, we use a numerical example to shed some light on the intermediate case and we assume 46 = 0.9602, ⇡(w) = ✓ w and 47 ✓ c = 1. We compute a solution to the functional equation (19) by iterating the function T (see (20)) from the initial condition = 0 to obtain a fixed point 48 . Afterwards, we use Proposition 4 to construct a BI equilibrium (W ⇤ , ⇤ , b ⇤ ). Finally, we compute µ , the invariant measure (over the laggard's cash) associated with the BI equilibrium (W ⇤ , ⇤ , b ⇤ ) . The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates (I). 49 It shows that, for a given ratio ✓ m , markups and "money left on the table" may have significant volatility across auctions due to the endogenous volatility of the firm's working capital and cash. how to generate the graph in the right panel of Figure 1 for di↵erent values of the ratio ✓/c. 48 Lemma S3 in the supplementary material shows that the generated sequence converges to a fixed point of Equation (19). 49 In Figure 1 we keep ✓ = c = 1 and vary m between 0.25 and 1. Interestingly, the graph remains the same for any combination of m and ✓ for which the ratio ✓/m varies between 1 and 4 while keeping c = ✓. Regarding (II), as ✓ m increases from 1 to 4, the left panel of Figure 1 shows that the standard deviation of the "money left on the table" varies from 0.17 to 0.04 whereas the central and right panels show, respectively, that the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) varies from 0.625 to almost 1 and that the distribution of Firm 1 market share shifts. 50
The fact that HHI is almost 1 and that the distribution of Firm 1 market share becomes concentrated on 0 and 1 for ✓ m ⇡ 4 illustrate (III). To the extent that there is a direct relationship between the size of the ratio ✓ m to the project's cost, our model predicts that concentration is greater for larger projects than for smaller ones. 51
Conclusion
We have studied a model of bidding markets with financial constraints. A key element of our analysis is that the stage at which firms choose their working capitals resembles an all pay auction with caps. This feature, and thus our results, seems pertinent for other models of investing under winner-take-all competition, like patent races. The introduction of private information about cost is a natural extension that nests both the standard model and our model and provides a framework to test between these two models. Existing results for all pay auctions and general contests 52 suggest these may be fruitful lines of future research. Furthermore, our analysis points out a tractable way to incorporate the dynamics of liquidity in Galenianos and Kircher's (2008) analysis of monetary policy. Although the main focus of our paper is positive, it also o↵ers interesting normative insights for markets in the absence of surety bonds (which implies firms' bids are unconstrained). It is well known that the possibility of bankruptcy creates distortions in these markets (see Calveras, Ganuza, and Hauk (2004) , and Zheng (2001)). Our paper shows that using surety bonds to insure against bankruptcy could also have dramatic consequences for markups and concentration. Porter and Zona (1993) explain that "the market for large jobs [in procurement of highway maintenance] was highly concentrated. Only 22 firms submitted bids on jobs over $1 million. On the 25 largest jobs, 45 percent of the 76 bids were submitted by the four largest firms."
52 Amann and Leininger (1996) study the relationship between the equilibrium of the all pay auction with and without private information and Alcalde and Dahm (2010) study the similarities between the equilibrium outcome in an all pay auction and in some other models of contests.
Appendix: Proofs
The proofs of the next lemmae are available in the supplementary material. We start with some auxiliary results that are used in the proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3. First, recall that we can restrict to mixed strategies
i }] and b ⇤ is as in (1). In Lemmas A1-A3 and Propositions 1-3, we study the equilibrium choices of working capital assuming that the firm bids according to b ⇤ .
j puts strictly positive probability on [w ✏, w] for any ✏ > 0 and {i, j} = {1, 2}.
(i) If the support of F i contains w 6 = 0, then the support of F j also contains w.
(ii) If w 2 (0, min{⌫ , m l }), then F i is continuous at w. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. To see why the proposed strategy is an equilibrium note that the expected payo↵ of Firm i with cash m i when it chooses working capital w and the other firm randomizes its working capital according to F , see (6), is equal to:
which, by definition of F in (8), is equal to m i if w  ⌫ , and strictly less than m i otherwise. Thus, deviations are not profitable, as required.
We now prove that the equilibrium is unique. The maximum of the support of (2) and Definition 2 imply that at least one firm earns less than m i when each chooses ⌫ and so that firm can strictly improve its payo↵ by choosing zero working capital. In Case (b), Lemma A3(ii) implies that F 1 and F 2 are continuous in (0, ⌫). Thus, if ⌫ = ⌫ , Lemma A3(vi) and F (⌫ ) = 1 imply that F 1 (0) = F 2 (0) = 0, and hence F 1 = F 2 = F , as desired. To finish the proof we show that ⌫ = ⌫ . Lemma A3(iv) implies that F i (0) = 0 for some i 2 {1, 2}. Hence Lemma A3(vi) implies that F i (w) = F (w) for w 2 [0, ⌫). To get a contradiction, suppose (5) and (8). ⌅
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We first show that the proposed candidate is an equilibrium. By (6) (replacing F with F L and m with m l ), (7), (8) and (10), the laggard's expected payo↵ from w 2 [0, m l ) is constant and equal to m l . The tie-breaking rule guarantees that this payo↵ is continuous at w = m l so that the laggard has no incentive to deviate. By (6) (replacing F with F l and m with m L ), (7), (8) and (9), the leader's expected payo↵ from w 2 [0, m l ] is constant and equal to m
so that the leader has no incentive to deviate.
To prove uniqueness, we use the fact that m l < ⌫ along with Lemma A3 ((i) and (iv)), to infer that the supports of the equilibrium distributions must have a common maximum that is weakly less than m l . Since m l < ⌫ , and m l 6 = m L , Lemma A3(v) can then be used to imply that each support equals [0, ⌫] for some ⌫ 2 (0, m l ] and Lemma A3(ii) implies that both distributions must be continuous on (0, ⌫). Since ⌫  m l < ⌫ , (2) and (8) imply that F (w) < 1 for any w 2 [0, ⌫], so that each distribution must have an atom either at 0 or at ⌫. Lemma A3 ((ii) and (iii)) implies that the laggard's atom is at 0 and the laggard's payo↵ must equal m l . Lemma A3(iv) then implies that the leader's atom is at ⌫. If ⌫ < m l , then the laggard can obtain a payo↵ higher than m l by choosing w 2 (⌫, m l ). Thus, ⌫ = m l so that (9) and (10) define the unique equilibrium distributions. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We first show that our proposal is an equilibrium. If m 2 (0, ⇠ ), then the payo↵ to each firm is
⌘ and the payo↵ to a deviation to w < m is (m (1 )w).
Deviations are unprofitable since w > 0, ⇡ decreases and ⇠ satisfies (12) implies
If m 2 (⇠ , ⌫ ), then, by construction, using (6), (8), (12), and (13) 
⌘ ⇡(⇠ ) and the limit, as w # 0, of j's expected payo↵ at w is ⇠ + F i (0) ⇡(0) which is greater than its payo↵ at ⇠ since ⇡(w) > ⇡(⇠ ) > 0 and (12) imply ⌘ < m in this case. In case (c) we know that equilibrium results when F i = F ⇤⇤ for i = 1, 2 by construction when m 2 ⇠ , ⌫ . That it is the only equilibrium follows since the expected payo↵s at 0 and at m must be equal so that
by (4) and (12). In this case, F 1 (w) = F 2 (w) is continuous on (0, ⌫) (Lemma A3(ii)) and
In this case, (13) and (A3) imply that ⌫ = (m) so that Lemma A3(vi) implies (1 )⌫ ⇡(⌫) < 1 since ⌫ < ⌫ . In case d(iii), by (A1), F i (w) is described by the right-hand side of (9) and F j (w), by that of (10) after replacing m l with ⌫ in (9) and (10). In this case, the payo↵ to i is constant and equal to m but the payo↵ to j is constant and equal to m ⌫(1 ) + ⇡(⌫) > m since ⌫ < ⌫ and so i can do better by deviating to w = m + ✏ for some small ✏ > 0. ⌅
Solutions to the Di↵erential Equation in (18)
It can be shown by taking derivatives that:
where we use in the second step that e 
Proof of Proposition 4
To show that our bid function b ⇤ solves the right hand side of the firm's Bellman equation
in Definition 4, we prove the more general argument that for our continuation value W ⇤ , and for any given bid and working capital of the rival, a working capital w and a bid b > ⇡(w) + c does strictly worse than the same bidb and the minimum working capital that makes this bid acceptable, i.e.w such that ⇡(w) + c =b. The argument is the same as in the static case: reducing today's working capital while keeping constant the bid increases today's utility in the amount of working capital reduced while it decreases tomorrow's continuation value in its discounted value. This is easy to deduce from the functional form of W ⇤ , see (25), when the reduction in today's working capital (keeping constant the bid) does not change the identity of tomorrow's leader. Otherwise, it is a consequence of both firms having the same cash when the identity of the leader changes, the implication of Assumption 1 that at least one firm has cash larger than ✓ at any information set, and that (25) and some algebra, we obtain that the expected payo↵ is
The derivative of Equation (A7) (25) and some algebra, we obtain that the laggard's expected payo↵ is (25) and some algebra, the leader's expected payo↵ is
The derivative of Equation (A9) with respect to w for w 2 [0, m] is 0 because F l,m defined in (21) solves (18) in [0, m] . The leader's expected payo↵ is given by (A9) evaluated at w = 0 and it equals W ⇤ (m, m 0 ) for m > m 0 and m 0 2 [0, ⌫ ] as required, as can be deduced using that is a fixed point of the operator T on P . ⌅
Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1 we show a more general result that we state as Theorem A1 below.
The lemma and definition that follows are used, respectively, in the proof of Lemma A5 and the statement of Theorem A1. In the proof of Theorem A1, we use the implication of (26) that:
for x m<m, ⌫ , which implies that:
for m ✓, by (21)- (23), because ⌫ < ✓ by Definitions 6 and 7. 
(ii) lim !1 F L,m (w) = 0 if w < min{✓, m}. (ii) lim "1 The definition of ✏ implies thatB ⇢ B.
By Lemma A10, it is su cient to show that lim "1 µ (E) = 0. We provide an upper bound for µ (E) for close to 1 and show that this bound converges to zero.
That Q(m, E) = 0 if m 6 2 D [ E (which follows from (A12) and (26)) and (27) imply:
That Q(m, D) = 0 if m 6 2 C [ D [ E (which follows from (A12) and (26)) and (27) imply:
. ( and solving for µ (E), one gets the first inequality below: To conclude the proof, we show that the last line of the right hand side of (A17) tends to zero as tends to 1.
First, note that ⇡(m) dy by Lemmas A8(i) and A9(ii), respectively, and that the limit of the product equals the product of the limits. Next note that:
by application of (A12), in the first step, and of (A11) and Lemma A9(i), and the property that the limit of a di↵erence is equal to the di↵erence of the limits, in the second step.
That the right hand side of the last line of (A17) tends to zero as tends to 1 follows from (A20)-(A21), Lemmas A9(iii) and A10, µ ([✓, ✓ + m])  1 and that the limit of the ratio equals the ratio of the limits when the denominator's limit is not zero. ⌅
